Robert Tucker of Mainline Consultant Services discusses the Washington DC Metro Rail Accident which has already given rise to several Metro victim lawsuits.
ANNOUNCER: Today’s program is brought to you by Traverse Legal. A law firm specializing in complex litigation, mass transit lawsuits and mass tort law. That's Traverse Legal, www.traverselegal.com, representing DC Metro passengers in lawsuits against responsible parties. Welcome to the Vertio Talk Radio Tech Spotlight with your host Damien Allen.
DAMIEN ALLEN: Good afternoon and welcome to Traverse Legal Radio. My name is Damien Allen and in the studio via the telephone joining me today is Mr. Bob Tucker of Mainline Consulting Service in Amarillo, Texas. Good afternoon Bob. How are you doing?
BOB TUCKER: I’m doing fine. Good afternoon to you, sir.
DAMIEN: Bob has been a locomotive engineer and he has been involved in train management operations as a train management operations supervisor and an investigator of major train accidents and also is a consultant and expert witness in the train accident during court cases. He’s been involved with us for the past thirty years. Thank you very much for joining us today. We are discussing the Washington Metro Rail accident that happened not too long ago. What are we looking at in this case?
BOB: These train operators that are employed by the Washington Metro, they start off as a bus driver for the Metro system. Then, at some point in time they apply, if they so choose, they apply to be employed as a train operator. I would like to know, and I’m sure that the National Transportation Safety Board would develop this as their investigation continues, but we sure need to know and address the qualifications that any candidate for train operator possess and, also, the training program that is implemented for training such personnel. I don’t know if they farm this out to other agencies or if they have in house training. I don’t know if it consists of just purely classroom. I don’t know if they have locomotive or train operations simulator. All of those facets of employment training need to be addressed. Also, once the candidate has been designated as a qualified operator I’d like to know who makes that qualification. How the qualification was made and, if that qualifier, himself or herself, if they are indeed qualified to make such assessments and judgments? And, once the operator is operating alone, without supervision, I would like to know if Metro has efficiency test program where they check on their operators and their performance from time to time. The main purpose of these operators, really, is to be a redundancy system in human form and that redundancy being to take charge of the train in the event that the automatic control system is experiencing a failure or giving out misinformation. And we have documentation that this particular metro system has had false indications whereby the experienced train operators did take over manual and prevented accidents of this nature, similar to this.
DAMIEN: What would cause one of the operators to switch over to a manual mode when it’s an automatic train system?
BOB: From my information, in 2005 there were two incidents involved with this system as trains were passing through the tunnel under the Potomac River. These operators visually saw that there were trains ahead of them and the automatic control system had not so advised them of that situation. I’ve also have information that their Metro establishes a block system of separation between trains; that is if the one train following another train going the same direction on the same track according to the President of their Union this space is 1200 feet, so if the operator makes a judgment decision during that timeframe, during that observation then he overrides the system and goes to manual operation where he is in full control of the train. Without that, in those two particular incidents in the tunnel underneath the Potomac River, there would have been collisions of catastrophic nature, particularly in a tunnel, in my opinion. Also, this is not the first fatality of a train operator on the metro system. I believe it was in 1996 the automatic system failed and the train operator at that point in time died in the collision. That was in Rockville, Maryland in 1996. When the National Transportation Safety Board investigated that particular accident part of their report stated that the metro operation has failed to fully understand the design features and the limitations of the automatic control system. So, to me, that implies that metro should have reviewed the system and its training of its personnel, the train operators, to make sure that this human redundancy factor of operation is definitely qualified to operate the train in the event that it is required.
DAMIEN: Typically, how much training would be required for somebody to become a locomotive engineer or train operator at this point?
BOB: Well, a locomotive engineer can go through training on the job training, and simulator training and then training out back on the job training might take as much as six months training. And even then, that training he has to pass numerous written tests. He has to make high grades on those and then he has to be evaluated and in the event that the evaluator is not satisfied they will give the candidate another chance through the training program, and then, if he doesn’t go through that successfully, then he will be terminated as a locomotive engineer trainee. It’s a very important program, or it should be, on all railroads. Particularly, any railroad like in metro systems throughout these large cities in the United States. They’re carrying high numbers of riders each day, particularly, during rush hour traffic such as this accident. This accident happened eight days ago at 5 PM and about 40% of the riders on that train are Government employees. And so, it’s just so terribly important. I also have in my file on this, I have about 43 pages of file that I’ve collected in the last eight days, and I’ve also notice that since Friday of last week and Monday and Tuesday, this being the third day, I have not been able to recover any additional information being released by any source. That does not mean that they’re not investigating it. I don’t mean that at all, but they do, as far as my sources, it has not been released. The National Transportation Safety Board is, as I’m sure you’re well aware, it may take up to a year for them to finalize their findings in this situation. The metro people, their management, should be heavily involved in this investigation and not wait for the National Transportation Safety Board to publish their findings. Once the National Transportation Safety Board publishes their findings they are not law. They are recommendations. Recommendations to the Department of Transportation, the Federal Department of Transportation, particularly the Federal Railway Administration, and then those recommendations may or may not be implemented. Fortunately for the public about 80% over the many years of the NTSB about 80% of their recommendations have been implemented. Probably 20% of them, the remainder, may not have been implemented with one of the primary factors being it’s a budgetary item and money is not appropriated or set aside to implement their recommendations. Metro in this case, they were running this particular train with old equipment and the NTSB had already recommended that they go through an extreme retrofits or their real recommendation, their primary recommendation, was just to replace the older equipment. Some of these cars are about 30 years old. And they replace those cars with new equipment. In this particular accident the leading car of the train that rear-ended the other train as we all know it climbed on the rear car of the other train and it has an anti-climber protrusion that is attached to the front of the car and it is a heavy steel structure in design and is supposed to: number one lesson the impact, and primary thing by designation is called an anti-climber and that’s to keep the train impacted the other train from climbing over top of it. This particular train that anti-climber device was knocked off. It did not stay intact and the car climbed the other car and by its own design two-thirds of it collapsed like an accordion, resulting in the death of the operator and eight other people. We have a design thing. There are many facets and the NTSB and the Metro system, I’m sure, that they will really get into this. They’ll get into this engineer, this operator, they call them operators. Get into this operators background find out if she was truly qualified and I’d like to know also if this was the first circumstance in which she had a chance to go into manual operation. It should be in her record in the event that she had previously operated a train in manual mode. Anytime they go into manual mode they’re supposed to report this to their communications center and number one so they can get out and find out what caused the malfunction of the automatic control system, because these trains run at 59 MPH and based on that, I think, this probably impacted the other train very close to that speed. The evidence of it telescoping two-thirds of the car, climbing, the anti-climber being knocked off, and also the engineer, or the train operator, of the parked train has stated that his train was knocked about seven feet forward and normally while it’s stopped he would have had the brakes applied to that train and a train with six cars of brakes applied being knocked seven feet is a very, in my opinion, a very high speed impact. And also we’re only dealing in getting back to the operator of the train that hit the other train at 59 MPH and with the block spacing of 1200 feet separation between trains per metro’s operative procedures. So, we’re dealing with 1200 feet and we’re dealing with a speed of 59 MPH as she approached and that is equivalent to 86.55 feet per second. So, when you go through the math of this her perception and reaction time during this 1200 feet at 59 MPH is 13.86 seconds. So, you have to react almost instantaneously as previously stated by experienced qualified train operators on the metro system. These people did react in that time frame, so you cannot sit there as a train operator and mull it over in your head, ‘Should I take manual control? Or, should I not?’ You have to be so experienced and so well trained that it becomes a reflex action. At that speed you do not have time to sit there and argue with yourself. You have to react instantaneously.
DAMIEN: With that accident the approach area was on a curve; how is the line of sight approaching the train operator to view a stopped train in front of it?
BOB: I’ve mentioned that I would like to see addressed they were supposed to have gone out and checked this line of sight. The line of sight may, I don’t know I haven’t found any release of information about that. The line of sight depending normally on the nature of the curve it may have enhanced the vision of the train in front, or it may have reduced the vision. So, that’s another fact that has to be established.
DAMIEN: Now, if there’s a stopped train on the track does the train that’s parked have the ability to contact anyone else who may be on that line and say, “Hey, I’m stopped here,”?
BOB: Well, that’s another question that I have raised. Is it operating procedure in the metro system when a train, its operator, has already assumed manual operation does he immediately contact? Does he have the means? Surely, he has a radio connection with the operation center that he would notify them. He’d say, “I’m train number such and such and I’ve assumed manual operation and I’m at such and such location.” And then, we he gets that information to the control center, I would think, the control center would then transmit that to any and all following trains back in that direction.
DAMIEN: Are these trains equipped with an event recorder, a black box, like an airplane?
BOB: This particular equipment is not per the information that I’ve gleamed from my research. This particular train was not equipped with a black box. And also, the NTSB, I’ve found out, that they recommended that software be added to this automatic control system that would record the speeds. This system it senses where the train is, its speed, so it can take over and do the braking of the train and stop the train at the station and then let the train depart the station once the passengers have been unloaded or loaded to continue its trip. So, my information is that metro has not implemented this software, though without the implementation of software to record speed and location of these trains and in the absence of the black box, now they’re going to have to go on speed estimations like I’ve touched on during this 13.86 seconds time frame. They also, the NTSB, have mentioned that they have found evidence that there may have been hard braking 125 feet prior to the collision due to the, they say, findings of interface metal between wheels and rails as it approached the stopped train. Another question, a regular locomotive, and I do not know if these metro cars are so equipped, when trains are put into emergency the sand needs to be automatically dropped on the rail in front of the wheels to increase adhesion and therefore reduce stopping distances. And I’m sure that metro know the stopping distance of these trains. They have to know it to program so they can operate safely within this 1200 feet of block spacing. So, NTSB I’m sure they’ll go out, and even metro they’ll go out, and produce the stop distances and the braking forces that are required to stop their trains, to slow their trains, etc. It’s my own understanding, I don’t know if they’ve resumed it yet or not but, after the accident I think metro put out the instructions that they would operate their trains at a reduced speed. I believe they said 35 MPH. And so, metro know they have a problem. Well, the whole Nation knows they have a problem now. And so, the thrust of my approach is to really concentrate if I were an investigator of it I would certainly my thrust would be to really get into the background, the train operators experience and that can all be documented from her W2 forms, how many hours she actually worked from her duty performance, if she was every tested by supervision, and was she fully rested when she assumed duty on this day. And, of course, they’re tracing cell phone records. They’re certainly hoping that there’s not another incident of that as happened out in California when that accident happened. And so, NTSB and, I certainly assume, metro that they will not leave any stones unturned and ultimately I’m sure and metro is already putting out instructions on how they will try to prevent this in the future. And I say NTSB they may release some preliminary reports, sometimes they do. But their final report they will address all issues. They will address the issue of the automatic train control system, its failure, why it failed, etc. What space it failed in? They will document all of that. They will also document the condition of the equipment. That’s another thing, speaking of the equipment, which I’m quite qualified to do. I have a report that the two lead cars of the train that rear-ended the other train, those two lead cars were two months past their required maintenance period and the checking of the brake equipment on those two cars. In the event that those two lead cars, which consisted of one-third of those cars in their braking forces, in the event that those two cars needed brake maintenance then that would have increased the stopping distance. Assuming that the engineer, the train operator, definitely did place this train in emergency and the evidence that we’ve found so far, as I’ve stated earlier, is that NTSB, what I’ve found out like I say, they’ve come up with 125 feet of which is indicative of a high impact because it takes a while for those brake shoes to get against those wheels and start maximum braking force. And so, time is of the essence in any and all situations like this. There again 13.86 seconds of time frame to react and stop a train.
DAMIEN: A lot of questions. We are out of time for today, Bob. Thank you very much for joining us and for giving us some insight on what they should be looking at and what’s going on with this case. And we all anxiously await the outcome. Once again, we’ve been speaking with Bob Tucker from Mainline Consulting Services of Amarillo, Texas. Thank you for joining us today, Bob.
BOB: You’re welcome, sir.
DAMIEN: You’ve been listening to the Traverse Legal Radio program. My name is Damien Allen in the studio. Everyone have a great afternoon.
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